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ABSTRACT 
Based on an empirical investigation, this study explores the influence of institutionalised social structures in governance 
models of virtual communities. Drawing upon institutional theory, the research shows that virtual communities are subject to 
the influence of their institutional environment, and that conflictive institutions dispute online spaces similarly to the 
phenomenon observed in offline interactions. The paper brings two main contributions: first, it reduces the gap in the 
scholarly literature on understanding the influence of institutions on virtual communities, and second, it proposes a new 
perspective in understanding governance structures in virtual communities. The literature on virtual communities emphasises 
that online collectives have adopted various levels of centralisation with regards to governance structures and decision 
making. This study proposes that virtual communities may cultivate parallel yet contradictory governance structures in 
environments populated by conflictive institutions, and that ideal models of governance may cover up actual patterned 
behaviours. 
Keywords 
Virtual communities, governance structures, decision making, institutional theory 
INTRODUCTION 
This research aims to add a new perspective on the influence of institutions on the domain of virtual communities – 
collectives that emerge from voluntary Internet interactions (Rheingold, 2000 [1993]; Steinmueller, 2002). Starting from a 
literature review on virtual communities, this study found that few academic researches focus mainly on understanding the 
influence of institutions in online interactions. This confirms similar conclusions from previous literature reviews on the 
domain (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman and Robinson, 2001; Venkatesh, 2003). However, there are a few exceptions in which 
this approach was central to the study (see for instance Matzat, 2004; and Souza, Nicolaci-da-Costa, Silva and Prates, 2004). 
The primary objective of this investigation is thus to understand the influence of institutions in virtual communities, mainly 
in their governance structures of decision making. The findings uncover a complex situation. Members of four Brazilian 
environmental-education virtual communities try to conciliate in their discourse two distinct schemas: on the one hand they 
cultivate the ideal of having decentralised governance structures, which they call network organisation; and on the other, they 
adopt centralised decision-making structures similar to hierarchical organisations. Grounded in institutional theory, this 
research explores and explains these contradictions. 
The next sections develop this argument. Firstly the paper introduces the domain of virtual communities, reviewing the 
literature on their governance structures, secondly it introduces essential concepts of institutional theory that are necessary for 
the discussion, thirdly it explains the adopted methodology and fourthly it presents findings and analyses. It concludes by 
highlighting the main findings and contributions of the paper. 
VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES 
One important theme in the literature related to the impact of the Internet in society is the development of virtual 
communities. These may be understood as social collectives that emerge from voluntary online interaction (Castells, 2001; 
Rheingold, 2000 [1993]; Steinmueller, 2002). In fact, the concept has been revealed to be flexible enough to be applied to 
Hercheui                        Parallel governance structures in virtual communities 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 2 
groups that have very distinct forms of online interaction (DiMaggio et al., 2001; Graham, 1999; Preece, 2001). However, 
some authors are more restrictive about how to use the concept. Graham (1999) suggests that only collectives that have 
voluntary membership, and whose members have common interests and accept a defined set of rules may be called virtual 
communities. 
One important theme on the domain of virtual communities is their governance structures (Rheingold, 2000 [1993]). Some 
authors adopt the concept of networks to describe organisation structures that emerge from online interactions, arguing that 
the Internet fosters non-hierarchical forms of organising in which decision making is decentralised among members, in a 
movement of flattering hierarchies and enabling more democratic collectives (Castells, 2001; Fukuyama, 1997; Slevin, 
2000). 
Although appealing, the association of virtual communities with decentralised governance structures is not unanimous. 
Authors criticise the concept of the network as simplistic and lacking the necessary precision to explain actual social 
practices (Fukuyama, 1997; Slevin, 2000). Furthermore, it is under dispute that online interactions are necessarily more 
democratic, since virtual communities reproduce a variety of governance models from the hierarchical to the democratic 
(Graham, 1999; Steinmueller, 2002). 
For instance, following a more hierarchical model open-source communities nominate coordinators who centralise decision 
making related to the release of software versions, thus preventing conflicts and the fragmentation of the community 
(Steinmueller, 2002). In a different fashion anti-corporate globalisation social movements reproduce decentralised decision 
making when coordinating their activities through the Internet (Juris, 2005). Similarly more participatory decision making 
has been observed by studies on how Indymedia organises a large network of voluntary members around the world (Pickard, 
2006). 
The literature on virtual communities shows that their governance structures may be more centralised or more decentralised. 
This research starts from this perspective to investigate how institutions influence virtual communities in their choice for 
governance structures, mainly related to decision making. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section develops a summary on institutional theory to support the analysis of the findings. Institutional theory proposes 
that institutions, understood as resilient social structures (patterned behaviour), strongly influence social actors, in such a way 
that determined social patterns are reproduced with a certain level of inertia (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001). It is easier to understand the nature of resilient social structures when one thinks about 
institutions such as marriage, the contract, the formal organisation, the army and the voting mechanism (Jepperson, 1991). 
Institutions influence behaviour through rule and normative systems that more closely constrain actors’ agency (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001), and through cultural-cognitive models, scripts and schemas, that may define understandings 
of the world, roles and forms of actorhood so that a pervasive social structure is understood as the only alternative in a 
situation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001). 
In addition, institutions are supported by bases of legitimacy (Scott, 2001) that may be understood as the assumption that 
specific behaviour is appropriate to a situation considering norms, values and beliefs associated with the respective social 
system (Jepperson, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy thus derives from regulative (formal rules), normative (moral bases) 
and cultural-cognitive systems (frames of reference) (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; 
March and Olsen, 1989; Scott, 2001). 
In defined circumstances, social actors may choose to conform to specific institutions in order to obtain the legitimacy to 
acquire the necessary resources from society (Meyer, 1992; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Studying formal organisations, Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) conclude that they keep parallel formal and informal structures. The formal structure is a kind of blueprint 
that reproduces practices and procedures that are recognised as rational models by society. Even when these practices and 
procedures are not the most efficient, organisations adopt them ceremonially as a way of gaining social legitimacy and 
maintaining the flow of resources that support their activities (ibidem). The informal structure, complementarily, is the more 
efficient and adequate to the everyday organisational needs (ibidem). 
Lastly, institutional theory highlights that although collectives have a high level of consensus about the appropriate behaviour 
in specific situations, this agreement is never absolute and social actors always have the possibility of enacting new social 
structures (Meyer, 1992). Social actors keep the freedom of choosing among different rules, norms and cognitive schemas, 
thus being able to combine them in different ways and enacting new patterns of behaviour (Jepperson, 1991; March and 
Olsen, 1989). In addition, institutions are ambiguous and contradictory and compete with each other, thus social actors 
Hercheui                        Parallel governance structures in virtual communities 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 3 
choose different institutions in different situations, bringing institutional change (Avgerou, 2002; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991; March and Simon, 1993 [1958]). 
METHODOLOGY 
This research adopts an explanatory theoretical approach, aiming to explore broader institutional mechanisms that may 
clarify a phenomenon (Gregor, 2006). Starting from this aim, this study follows an interpretive perspective, understanding 
that the investigation of social phenomena may rely on the conceptualisation that social actors have about their situation 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Habermas, 1981 [1968]). Grounded in a qualitative methodology, the investigation is 
based on 58 in-depth, face-to-face interviews (Esterberg, 2002; Mason, 2002) with members of four Brazilian environmental-
education virtual communities. These are as follows (membership numbers refer to April-June 2006): 
• Rebea (Brazilian Environmental-Education Network): active since 1992 in national level. Membership: 380 members on 
the general list; around 600 members on Orkut (social network) (some members are in both lists). 
• Repea (São Paulo Environmental-Education Network): active since 1992, in the State of São Paulo. Membership: around 
560 members on the general list. 
• Remtea (Mato Grosso Environmental-Education Network): active since 1996, in the State of Mato Grosso. Membership: 
around 200 members on the general list. 
• Reasul (Brazilian South-Region Environmental-Education Network): active since 2002. Membership: around 2,000 
members on the general list. 
These collectives are informal organisations characterised as virtual communities as defined by Graham (1999): membership 
is voluntary, the collective shares similar interests related to environmental education and has a minimum set of rules for 
admission and participation. These communities are also independent of each other, although members may participate in 
more than one community. Their main activities are the sharing of information and knowledge by the Internet, and the 
political mobilisation of members in order to influence decisions of governments and private organisations about topics 
related to the environment and the environmental education. 
The selection of respondents has followed a snowball process, a method that is accepted in qualitative research (Esterberg, 
2002; Warren, 2002). The first contact with these collectives was with members who were referred on the communities’ 
websites as spokespersons. These members indicated others, a process that was followed successively, only including active 
members, to the point of having saturation of data, when new respondents were not adding information (Flick, 2002; Mason, 
2002). In being a methodology that does not follow the sampling perspective, it is not possible to infer to what degree these 
interviewees are representative of the whole community, but it is clear that they had similar understandings on their 
governance structures considering the saturation of data. The value of this research is not in linking the individual perception 
with community demographics, but in the aggregation of interpretations in a coherent body that is supported by the 
theoretical analysis (institutional theory), as expected in an interpretive research (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Flick, 
2002; Habermas, 1981 [1968]; Mason, 2002). 
These interviews were conducted between April and June 2006 in Portuguese. The original conversations have been 
transcribed and codified and then excerpts and constructs have been translated into English by this researcher. The method of 
building constructs based on interviews is applied by scholars in the field of information systems (Avgerou, 2002; Avgerou, 
Ciborra and Land, 2004; Walsham, 1993), as an alternative option to the investigation of documents in the hermeneutic 
tradition. In this paper only the main constructs, understood as summarised ideas that represent the meaning brought by 
interviewees are presented. Respondents are identified by their communities and by a number that preserves their 
individuality without revealing their identity, as this research is compromised in preserving the anonymity of respondents. 
The findings in the tables are presented by community, however for the sake of analysis they are aggregated as a unique case 
study because the limitations of this paper do not permit elaboration of a multiple case-study approach (Yin, 2003). The 
consistency of findings across cases permits this kind of aggregation. Indeed, this consistency reinforces the reliability and 
validity of this study, which has also obtained a good degree of adherence in relation to the adopted theoretical lens (Mason, 
2002; Yin, 2003).  
The empirical objects of this research have been chosen strategically, as accepted in the interpretive tradition (Patton, 2002). 
A previous pilot study has revealed the particular governance structures of these communities. On the one hand these 
collectives present themselves publicly (also on their websites) as groups that adopt the network (decentralised) model of 
governance (ideal model). On the other hand they have centralised structures of decision making (actual model), such as 
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excluding ordinary members (non-leaders) from decisions related to choosing community representatives and publishing 
content in their websites. The communities were chosen because centralised structures of decision making are pervasive in 
formal, hierarchical organisations Simon (1997 [1945]), thus chances were that the informal collectives have been influenced 
by the institutionalised governance structure. In this direction the choice was strategic, as there was an opportunity of 
exploring an observed phenomenon, not implying that these communities have special reasons for developing such structures 
either because they are Brazilian, or because they focus on environmental education instead of any other topic.  
Acknowledging this contradiction between ideal and actual models this research investigates the influence of institutions in 
the governance structures of these communities. In the first part of interviews members were asked to explain why their 
communities are called networks, thus permitting them space to construct their interpretation of their ideal model of 
governance. In the second part of the interviews they were asked to describe in detail actual situations of decision making, 
thus allowing respondents to think about their governance models not only as described in their websites, but also as an 
empirical experience they have had. The findings are presented below. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Confirming the pilot study, the research findings show that there is a contradiction between how members in the studied 
communities abstractly define their ideal model of decision making, and how the communities actually decide collective 
issues. 
When describing their governance structures abstractly (not related to an empirical experience of decision making), 
community members recall their adherence to the principles of networks, egalitarian spaces in which all members may 
participate in decision making. Interviewees contrast this ideal model to hierarchical models of decision making, in which 
some people centralise decision-making processes, thus making decisions on behalf of others. 
The table below summarises the main constructs that have emerged from the first part of the interviews when members 
describe their principles as network organisations. In the columns related to the communities the members are identified by 
their number in order to keep their anonymity, as explained in the methodology. 
Constructs Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul 
The community has non-hierarchical, 
decentralised decision-making structures. 
Members 2, 3, 4, 
6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 
17 
 Members 1, 4, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
 Members 1, 2, 
4, 6, 8, 11, 13 
 Members 1, 4, 
5, 7, 9, 12, 14 
All members have the same rights and power, 
thus there is not subordination between members. 
Members 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6, 17 
 Members 1, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 
Members 1, 4, 
6, 9, 10, 11, 13 
Members 1, 2, 
4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 
14 
All members have the same right of 
communicating and expressing (freedom of 
speech, non-censorship). 
 Members 1, 3, 6, 
6, 14 
Members 1, 5, 
9, 10 
Members 1, 2, 
8, 12, 13, 14 
Members 2, 3, 
7, 8, 10 
Decisions are taken by consensus, attending the 
different interests of members. 
Members 2, 5, 6, 
9, 14, 16 
Members 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 9 
Members 1, 2, 
6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 
15 
Members 4, 6, 
7, 11, 12 
Table 1 – Characteristics of the idealised network model 
The four constructs in table 1 build the idea of having a network organisation in which members have the same rights, thus 
participating in decision making in a decentralised fashion. The first construct summarises the idea of having a network 
governance structure: the community has non-hierarchical, decentralised decision-making structures. 
Some members cite that their communities follow the principles of network organisations as described by Martinho (2003): 
horizontal patterns of coordination that oppose hierarchical governance structures. Interviewees also relate network 
governance structures to the ideals of participatory democracy that are pervasive in social movements. In fact, since the 
1960s, a significant number of social movements have adopted decentralised governance structures in which members 
participate in decision making in a more egalitarian fashion thus avoiding delegation of power (Epstein, 1996; Pickard, 2006; 
Polletta, 2002). 
Interviewees also point out that the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
1992) inspired these communities in aiming to build network organisations. During this conference the Global Forum of 
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Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) elaborated on documents (Treaty on Environmental Education for Sustainable 
Societies and Global Responsibility and Communication, Information, Media and Networking Treaty) that suggest social 
movements should promote network forms of organising, such as networks of environmental educators. 
Interestingly, when asked to relate in detail empirical cases of decision making, interviewees describe situations in which 
some members centralise the process, as summarised in the table below. 
Construct Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul 
The community has a leadership group, which 
centralises decision-making processes, and 
organises its discussions through a segregated 
discussion list. 
Members 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
13, 14, 16 
Members 1, 2, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Members 1, 2, 
4, 6, 7, 8, 10 
Members 1, 2, 
3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 
11, 12 
The leadership group decides which members 
represent the group in events and courses. 
Members 1, 2, 3, 
5, 7, 10, 14 
Members 1, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
10, 11 
Members 1, 2, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
13, 15 
Members 1, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 9, 12 
The leadership group controls website 
publications and communications. 
Members 1, 2, 5, 
8, 14, 16 
Members 1, 2, 
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11 
Members 1, 2, 
13 
Members 1, 2, 
4, 9, 10, 12, 13 
The leadership group sanctions community 
moderators who have more power than ordinary 
members. 
Members 1, 2, 3, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
14, 16 
Members 1, 2, 
3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 
11 
Members 2, 3, 
4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
13, 14, 15 
Members 1, 2, 
7, 13, 14 
Table 2 – Characteristics of the actual centralised model 
The constructs above show that the communities have leadership groups which, in practice, centralise their decision making, 
such as choosing community representatives in events (also in negotiations with governments and sponsors), deciding about 
contents published on the websites and approving membership or exclusion from the community.  
The first construct in table 2 summarises the actual practices in these communities: leadership groups have segregated 
discussion lists in which ordinary members cannot participate. By definition, one only enters segregated discussion lists when 
one becomes a member of the leadership group by invitation (or approval) of leaders. The communities do not have formal 
and systematic mechanisms for alternating leaders (such as regular elections), thus the leadership group may perpetuate their 
condition without facing the valuation of ordinary peers. Decision making is conducted mainly in these segregated lists. 
This procedure of segregating decision making goes against the ideal of having a network organisation, indeed, the social 
structures which emerged when members describe their actual practice are not similar to the principles of either participatory 
or representative democracy as leaders in these communities have not been chosen by vote. These collectives do not have 
rules for alternating power and it is not clear how leaders represent the interests of community members (Pickard, 2006; 
Urbinati, 2006). 
In practice the governance structures in these communities are closer to hierarchical organisations. Studying organisation 
structures, Simon (1997 [1945]) explains that organisations centralise decision making believing this is a more effective way 
of coordinating collective tasks. In this model, organisations adopt a hierarchical division of labour: supervisory authorities 
make decisions on behalf of subordinated others (ibidem). The hierarchical model is pervasive in society, from business and 
governmental organisations, to religious and voluntary ones (ibidem). 
Analysing the findings, these virtual communities adopt two parallel governance structures in a similar fashion as observed 
by Meyer and Rowan (1977) in formal organisations. When presenting themselves as social movements that adopt network-
governance structures, members explain their values and procedures in relation to the ideal model of decentralising decision 
making. In this way, they keep coherency in relation to their ideal models, which is institutionalised, at least rhetorically, 
among social activists around the world and has the support of the Global Forum of NGOs. Identifying themselves as 
environmental social movements, these communities prefer to keep a formal governance structure that is coherent with the 
values of similar collectives. In this way they legitimate themselves as democratic social movements, thus qualifying for 
receiving resources and support from segments in society and for representing the interests of significant segments in society. 
In practice the communities informally adopt a more centralised decision making which emerges when members give details 
about their empirical experience. Members recall different reasons to explain their practice in accordance with the context of 
the described situation. For instance, arguments related to power and authority systems are very pervasive: those who have 
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more power and status in society more easily are leaders in these communities, legitimising their roles as decision makers. 
Often members also point out the fact that hierarchical schemas, routines and procedures are very pervasive in society, 
influencing the communities in spite of their efforts in enabling decentralised decision-making processes. Furthermore, some 
members relate their centralised social structures to the need of legitimising the communities in society, as governments and 
sponsors would not support communities that do not have a leadership group that is accountable for the collective. In sum, 
the centralised decision making is also a legitimate institutionalised structure considering other spheres in society that support 
the communities with money and resources. 
In fact, this contradiction is recognised by some members who spontaneously talk about this incoherence and the difficulty of 
building effective network governance structures, as summarised in table 3. 
Construct Rebea Repea Remtea Reasul 
Member recognises the incoherence between 
community’s ideal and actual governance models. 
Members 1, 2, 3, 
6, 10, 17, 11 
Members 2, 
8, 4 
Members 1, 2, 
4, 8, 11 
Members 1, 3, 
5, 7, 9, 10 
Table 3 – Identification of conflict between the ideal and the actual models 
Indeed, some ordinary members and leaders oppose the actual practice of centralising decision making, as it confronts their 
principle of having network structures. In spite of these critical voices the communities keep the described parallel structures. 
On the other hand, some ordinary members ignore the actual practices of the community because they are marginal to the 
decision making, thus they are just able to present the formal description of their ideal models, even ignoring the existence of 
segregated discussion lists. It happens because leadership groups avoid informing ordinary members about the existence of 
segregated discussion lists and the centralisation of decision making. In spite of this attempt, many ordinary members are 
aware of the actual governance structures in these communities. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Considering the discussed findings, interpreted through the lens of institutional theory, this research presents two main 
conclusions. Firstly, the studied virtual communities cultivate two parallel decision-making structures. On the one hand 
community members present their collectives as being network organisations in which all participants may take a part in 
decision making. This structure (ideal model) is institutionalised in some social spheres, such as social movements, thus 
justifying the efforts of these communities to keep the image of network organisations alive as they also identify themselves 
with social movements. On the other hand members recognise their actual reproduction of centralised decision making in a 
similar fashion to hierarchical organisations (actual model). Although this is not the formal structure these communities 
would like to present to society, members recognise that the communities are influenced by the fact that centralised decision 
making is an institutionalised model in society as it is an inherent structure of hierarchical organisations. 
Secondly, the studied virtual communities reflect the conflict between different institutions in society. Both centralised and 
decentralised governance models are legitimate in society although different social rules, norms and beliefs are behind each 
model. The studied communities struggle to keep their legitimacy as political actors in this conflictive environment. On the 
one hand they try to keep legitimacy as network organisations in their formal presentation to society, through their websites 
and the declaration of members. On the other hand, they have actual practices of centralising decision making which are more 
pervasively legitimate in society. In keeping the ambiguity of having parallel structures rooted in different institutions, these 
virtual communities struggle to keep the legitimacy in face of a broader social spectrum from social movements to the 
government and other formal organisations. 
Thus, this research has two main contributions to the scholarly literature. Firstly, it provides insights into the influence of 
institutions on virtual communities, reducing a gap in the literature related to virtual communities as highlighted in the 
introduction to this paper. Second, it provides a new perspective on discussing the governance structures of virtual 
communities. The literature on virtual communities emphasises mainly the fact that different communities adopt different 
governance structures, some more centralised than others. In this paper it is argued that some virtual communities may have 
more complex governance, enacting parallel structures to better cope with a fragmented institutionalised context. Considering 
that many online groups cross institutional boundaries, this study informs other researchers on the possibility of having 
virtual communities which have parallel competing governance structures. This study also informs researchers on how virtual 
communities may use the discourse on ideal models of governance to cover up their actual practices. Naturally further 
research is necessary to understand the arguments that support each social structure in particular communities and to explore 
how community members conciliate their contradictions when faced with irreconcilable models. 
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